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LEGISLATING THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL LAW
By LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY,* CARL A. ANDERSON**
INTRODUCTION
The necessity, or choice of evils, defense has not been raised
very frequently. This is, no doubt, partly due to the relative rarity
of such situations and to the fact that police and prosecutors
screen out most of those cases that do come to their attention.
The importance of this body of law, however, may increase as
recodification of criminal law spreads. About 24 new criminal
codes have been adopted in the past dozen years, and almost as
many are in the legislative process. Many of these new codes have
a section dealing with the necessity defense. This analysis is
based largely on these new statutes and proposals, whether or not
they have been enacted, as they are likely to be interpreted in
light of the existing, but rather meager, case law of this defense.'
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; A.B., 1961, LL.B., 1963,
Washington University; S.J.D., 1967, University of Wisconsin.
**B.A., 1972, Seattle University; J.D., 1975, University of Denver College of Law.
' The statutory analysis in this article is based on the following documents. The
status of these materials is in flux and should be checked by the reader if an up-to-date
citation is required. Hereinafter, we will cite the source as noted.
Alaska: S. Bill 6, 9th Legis., 1st Sess. § 11.13.020 (undated) and H. Bill 524,
7th Legis., 2d Sess. § 11.13.020 (1972) [these provisions are identical and are
hereinafter cited as ALAs.].
Arkansas: Ark. Crim. Code, Act 280 of 1975 § 504 (effective Jan. 1, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as ARK.].
California: Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code,
The Criminal Code § 610(b) (Staff Draft, undated) [hereinafter cited as
CAL.]. This proposed statute is not included in S. Bill 565 (unamended
version, 1975).
Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
CoLO.].
Deleware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DEL.].
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 302 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
HAWAII].
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 18-302 (Supp. 1972, repealed 1972) [hereinafter cited
as IDAHO].
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1961) [hereinafter cited
as ILL.].
Indiana: Criminal Law Study Commission, Indiana Penal Code § 35-11.1-
5-7 (Proposed Final Draft 1974) [hereinafter cited as IND.].
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
KY.].
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Our analysis leads to two general conclusions: legislation rec-
ognizing the defense is needed; and the proposal of the Model
Maine: S.P. 113-L.D. 314, An Act Creating the Maine Criminal Code, tit.
17A, § 103 (enacted June 1975, effective March 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as ME.].
Maryland: Commisson on Criminal Law, Proposed Criminal Code §
35.05(2) (1972) [hereinafter cited as MD.].
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Criminal Law Revision Commission,
Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts § 40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
MAss.]. S. Bill 200 § 40 (1972), which contained the necessity defense, failed
to pass.
Michigan: Special Committee of the Michigan State Bar for the Revision
of the Criminal Code and Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence of the State
Bar of Michigan, Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 605 (Final Draft 1967)
[hereinafter cited as MICH.].
Missouri: The Committee to Draft a Modern Criminal Code, The Proposed
Criminal Code for the State of Missouri § 8.040 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Mo.].
Nebraska: Legislative Bill 329, 83d Legis., 1st Sess. § 60 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as NEB.].
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as N.H.].
New Jersey: New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Comm'n, Vol. 1: Report
and Penal Code & Vol. II: Commentary § 2C:3-2 (Final Report, 1971) and
Assembly No. 3282 § 2C:3-2 (1975) [hereinafter cited collectively as N.J.].
New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y.].
Oklahoma: Committee Substitute for S. Bill 46, 35th Legis., 1st Sess. § 1-
303 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OKLA.].
Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1973 Replacement Part) [hereinafter
cited as ORE.].
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 503 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
PA.].
South Carolina: Proposed Draft of the South Carolina Criminal Code §
12.10 (1971) and S. Bill 278 § 12.10 (1973) [hereinafter collectively cited as
S.C.].
Tennessee: Law Revision Commission, Tennessee Criminal Code and Code
of Criminal Procedure § 39-721 (Proposed Final Draft, 1973) and S. Bill 600
§ 721 (1975) [hereinafter collectively cited as TENN.].
Texas: TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TEX.].
Vermont: Proposed Criminal Code of Vermont § 202 (1970), deleted from
H. Bill 419 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VT.].
Washington: Revised Washington Criminal Code § 9A.16.020 (1970), de-
leted from Substitute Bill 2092, 44th Legis., 1st Sess. (enacted 1975, effective
1976) [hereinafter cited as WASH.].
Wisconsin: WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Wis.].
A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL PENAL CODE].
Kommentarii Kugolovnomu Kodeksu RSFSR (Commentary on the Criminal Code of




Penal Code is superior to later legislative efforts to improve upon
it.
I. THE VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT DISTINGUISHED
The necessity defense always involves a voluntary choice on
the part of the actor and should, therefore, be distinguished from
the "defense" based on the absence of a voluntary act.2
[T]o treat leaving the ship under stress of perils of the sea as not
distinguishable on principle from being torn bodily away from it by
tempest . . . is one of the oldest fallacies of the law. The difference
between the two is the difference between an act and no act. The
distinction is well settled in the parallel instance of duress by
threats, as distinguished from overmastering physical force applied
to a man's body and imparting to it the motion sought to be attrib-
uted to him.
3
A frequent problem from the defendant's perspective is that his
claim of involuntariness will be wrongly classed by the court as
necessity. Thus, attention is focused on the desirability of compli-
ance with the law, rather than on the possibility of compliance,
which is the true issue in involuntariness cases. The involvement
of natural forces often leads some authorities to misinterpret a
defense based on the lack of a voluntary act and to misclassify
the case as one of necessity. This misclassification occurred in one
case where the defendant was under an obligation to maintain a
' The word "necessity" ... is somewhat misleading. Strictly speaking there
is no necessity in the sense that the thing is inevitable or unavoidable. For
if it were, then there would be the legal defence that the accused's act was
not voluntary. In reality the position is that the person (perhaps with very
good reason) much prefers to do the thing which he does rather than some-
thing else, which would be more unpleasant.
KENNY'S OUrLINES OF CRIMINAL LAw 67 (J. Turner ed. 1962).
[T]he word "necessity" is only used by the defence to a charge of crime in
what is the vain hope of making the criminal deed appear to have been the
result either of involuntary conduct, or of some irresistible external compul-
sion, instead of being what it really was, the result of a voluntary choice of
that alternative which the accused felt to be the less disagreeable to himself.
1 RUSSELL ON CRIME 93 (J. Turner ed. 1964).
Mr. Justice Holmes in The Eliza Lines, 199 U.S. 119, 130 (1905). Jerome Hall
distinguishes "harms caused solely by the operation of physical forces and harms which
were inflicted under pressure of such forces" and relies upon Aristotelian metaphysics to
develop the term "teleological necessity" to describe the act which is the proper subject
of the necessity defense. J. HALL, GENERA.L PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 425 (2d ed. 1960).
See also Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 390, 82 N.E. 781, 781 (1907), wherein the court stated,
"there must be, if not a physical, at least a moral, necessity for the act." (dictum).
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road that could not be maintained because of natural forces;4 and
in another case where a ship, because of a storm, was forced upon
the shore of a foreign country without the required entry permit.5
Most of these cases, as Jerome Hall points out, involve an omis-
sion to perform an affirmative duty.' It should be clear that a
failure to act without the ability to act does not involve the justifi-
cation of necessity. There is no crime to justify. Similarly, where
the defendant was caught in a traffic jam, conviction for illegal
parking could not be upheld; not because defendant made the
right choice, but because he had no choice.' Courts have also ap-
plied the doctrine to cases where a more appropriate analysis
would justify the defendant's conduct on the theory that it did
not cause the harm anticipated by the statute or, in the alterna-
tive, that the defendant's action was not within the harm sought
to be avoided by the statutory prohibition.'
II. RELATIONSHIP OF THE HARMS
Codification of the necessity defense has tended, in most
instances, to increase the stringency of the required relationship
of the harm committed to the harm avoided.9 At common law the
Regina v. Bambler, 5 Q.B. 279 (1843).
The Diana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354 (1868). See generally The Struggle, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 71 (1815); The William Grey, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (No. 17,694) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810);
The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 240, 165 Eng. Rep. 450 (In. 1801).
J. HALL, supra note 3, at 424; Commonwealth v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 202
Mass. 394, 88 N.E. 764 (1909).
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434 (1868).
Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 566 (1905); State v.
Burris, 10 Ore. App. 297, 500 P.2d 265 (1972), and cases cited therein.
I A comparison of foreign jurisdictions reveals a variety of formulations of the rela-
tion: Argentina: "caused a harm in order to avert another greater and imminent harm,"
[1963] Anales de Legislacion Argentina art. 34 (Argentina Penal Code). See also 6
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 28 (G. Mueller ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN SERIES]. Denmark: the interests to be sacrificed to avoid the harm must be of
"relatively minor importance," DANISH COMM'N ON COMPARATIVE LAW, DANISH AND SWEDISH
LAW ch. 9, § 23 (1963). Egypt: "the danger must be great, not merely great in proportion
to the gravity of the offense committed [and it] must be one of bodily evil," Egyptian
Penal Code, art. 61 (1937). Greenland: "necessary to prevent impending damage to per-
sons or property, when the offense is relatively insignificant," Greenland Criminal Code
§ 6 (1954). See also 16 AMERICAN SERIES 16 (1970). Japan: "the injury produced by such
act is not out of proportion to the injury which was sought to be averted," Penal Code of
Japan, Art. 37. But see J. TAKEUCHI, A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL CODE
OF JAPAN, art. 14 (1964), which states "the harm resulting therefrom does not exceed the
harm sought to be averted." See also 8 AMERICAN SERIES 23 (1964). Norway: speaks of
the "danger as extremely significant in relation to the damage his act might cause,"
Norwegian Penal Code § 47 (1902). See also 3 AMERICAN SERIES 29 (1961). Poland: "the
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required relationship was that "the evil inflicted by [the defen-
dant's act] was not disproportionate to the evil avoided."' 0 The
Model Penal Code and some of its adherents require the harm
avoided to be "greater than" the harm done," but some states go
further and require that the harm averted "clearly outweigh" the
harm caused. 2 The New York code is the strictest. It requires that
"the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly out-
weigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be pre-
vented by the statute defining the offense in issue.' 3 Whether
this issue can be clarified through objective criteria provided by
legislation seems doubtful. The commentary to the Texas code,
which adopts the New York language, underscores this point:
"[W]hat is 'harm' and what 'harms' are greater than others are
questions purposefully left for case-by-case determination ....
[T]his is inevitable in stating a general principle . . . ."" Fur-
thermore, some crimes deal with behavior that has no harm com-
ponent. 1
New York introduced a further explicit limitation on the
balancing of the evils: "The necessity and justifiability of [the
defendant's] conduct may not rest upon considerations pertain-
ing only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in
its general application or with respect to its application to a par-
ticular class of cases arising thereunder."' 6 The New York com-
good sacrificed does not represent a value manifestly greater than the good being rescued,"
Polish People's Republic Penal Code, art. 23 (1969). See also 19 AMERICAN SERIES 39 (1973).
Republic of China: "the act averting danger [may not be] excessive," Republic of China
Criminal Code art. 24; see 2 COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 187 (D.
Kang ed. 1971). Soviet Union: the "harm caused is less significant than the harm pre-
vented," R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) § 14 (amended through July 1965)
(U.S.S.R.). See also SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 149 (2d ed.
H. Berman & J. Spindler transl. 1972); Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56
YALE L.J. 803 (1947).
J. STEPHAN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, art. 32 (1878). See also Chesapeake &
O.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 566 (1905).
* MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); see ALAS.; HAWAII; IDAHO; ILL.;
IND.; Ky.; NEB.; OKLA.; PA.; VT.; WASH.
* See CoLo.; DEL.; ME.; MD.; MICH.; N.Y.; ORE.; S.C.; TEX.
13 N.Y.
" TEX., Comment.
"5 It is precisely this absence of harm which makes much police work known as
encouragement legally acceptable; see Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of
Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871 (1963).
" N.Y. States which have adopted New York's limitations are: ARK.; COLO.; DEL.;
IND.; MD.; MICH.; MO.; ORE.
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mentary points out that this provision renders the necessity de-
fense "unavailable to the mercy killer, the crusader who considers
a penal statute unsalutary because it tends to obstruct his cause,
and the like."'"
The thrust of this limitation is aimed at withholding the
defense from persons attempting to justify acts of civil disobedi-
ence. However, courts have obtained the same result in the ab-
sence of legislative guidance by finding defendants unable to sat-
isfy other elements of the defense, including imminence, 8 lack of
alternatives, 9 and a reasonable nexus between the defendant's
act and the harm sought to be avoided. 0 The doctrine of necessity
is generically inappropriate to justify acts of civil disobedience,
since the defendant's conduct, rather than attempting to directly
avoid a specific harm, attempts to transcend accepted demo-
cratic processes and seeks to change a political decision of society
which may only secondarily avoid a particular harm or evil.2'
'1 N.Y., Comment. In order to avoid possible confusion in interpreting the restriction,
the commentary to the proposed Maryland statute says
[t]he New York provision states that the defense may not rest on considera-
tions pertaining "only" to the morality and advisability of the statute; this
suggests that such considerations may properly be considered as a partial
contribution to the defense. The Commission believes that they should not
be relevant at all, and has therefore deleted the word "only".
MD., Comment.
" Where prisoners in a correctional institution held guards and civilians as hostages
under threats to kill them if needed improvements in living conditions within the institu-
tion were not made, a New York court denied the necessity defense since the conduct could
not be found to be "necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or
private injury which is about to occur." People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d
342, 347 (1972).
11 Finding that alternative opportunities for noncriminal protest were available; and
that "the harmful acts to be prevented by defendants' actions were, at best, only ten-
uously connected with the situs of the crime" and were "not reasonably designed to
actually prevent the threatened greater harm." State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 458, 509
P.2d 1095, 1109 (1973), upheld the conviction of defendants on charges of criminal trespass
to private property during an attempt to stop "war crimes" by a major defense contractor.
1 In United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972), defendant was convicted
on charges of having destroyed government property. The court found an essential element
of the necessity defense to be that "a direct causal relationship be reasonably anticipated
to exist between the defender's action and the avoidance of harm," and held that it was
unreasonable for defendant to assume that burning local draft board records would termi-
nate United States involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. Id. at 518.
21 Where defendant burned selective service records during an antiwar protest,
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971), the court rejected defendant's
necessity defense and concluded that:
[olne who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own hands
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III. LIMITATIONS ON THE HARM THREATENED
At common law it seems to have been a generally recognized
requirement of the necessity defense that the harm threatened be
"imminent," although there is some confusion about the term's
meaning. Under the current statutes and proposals it is unclear
if there is a division of opinion on the "imminence" question. The
Model Penal Code and many others have no such explicit require-
ment. On the other hand, New York and its followers appear to
be quite rigid, requiring that defendant's conduct be "necessary
as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private
injury."2 Under codes taking the Model Penal Code approach of
omitting an explicit reference to "imminence," a court could, of
course, infer such a requirement from the words "necessary" or
''emergency measure. ' '23
Where imminence is thought to be a requirement, however,
its meaning may be misunderstood, resulting in an erroneous
limitation on the defense. The lay definition of "imminent" is
"likely to happen without delay. "21 However, given the purposes
served by the necessity doctrine in criminal law, the proper use
of the imminence requirement is to focus attention on the proba-
bility of the threatened harm actually occurring. While immedi-
acy is obviously relevant to making that determination, the mis-
take sometimes made is to assume that it is all that is relevant,
obscuring the point that other factors are also potentially rele-
thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to determine policy
is superior to democratic decision making. [Defendant's] professed unsel-
fish motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of
arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate.
Id. at 392. See also Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972). The judicial concern towards this attitude about
law is nicely represented by R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEAsoNs 66 (1960):
More: [Would you] cut a great road through the law to get after the
Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round
on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast. . . and if you cut them down
.. .d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.
21 N.Y.; Wis.
1 Texas requires the actor's conduct be "immediately necessary." TEX. Tennessee
has used the same language. TENN.
" WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTONARY (2d College ed., 1970) (emphasis added).
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vant. Furthermore, the existence vel non of reasonable alterna-
tives ought to be relevant to determining whether the threatened
harm is imminent: the threatened harm should not be considered
imminent if there were alternative ways of preventing it other
than by the commission of a crime.
In Aldrich v. Wright 5 the court observed:
The term "imminent" does not describe the proximity of the
danger by any rule of mechanical measurement. . . .The law does
not fix the distance of time between the justifiable defense and the
mischief, for all cases, by the clock or the calendar. The chronologi-
cal part of the doctrine of defense, like the rest of it, is a matter of
reasonableness; and reasonableness depends upon circumstances .2
The strongest recognition of this view is found in the commentary
to the Missouri Proposed Code which, being patterned after New
York's, includes the "imminent" requirement:
[Ilt must be remembered that what constitutes "emergency mea-
sure" and "imminent" does not depend solely on the interval of time
before the injury sought to be prevented will occur. Additional cir-
cumstances of the particular fact situation must also be evaluated.
Thus, if under the circumstances, the mere passage of time is such
that a reasonable man would perceive no viable alternatives to his
present course of conduct the fact that the injury sought to be pre-
vented will not take place for some time hence, e.g., six hours, will
not prevent the use of the defense of justification under this section,
provided it is otherwise available."
Yet, of all the states that use the same or an equivalent term, only
the Missouri commentary makes it clear that imminence is not
exclusively a temporal component.
In the context of the more specific justification of self-
defense, it has been pointed out that "[i]f the threatened viol-
ence is scheduled to arrive in the more distant future, there may
be avenues open to the defendant to prevent it other than to kill
or injure the prospective attacker; but this is not so where the
attack is imminent." 8 Thus, temporal "imminence" of the threat
53 N.H. 398, 16 Am. Rep. 339 (1873). See also Reid, Of Men, and Minks, and a
Mischievous Machinator, 1 N.H.B.J. 23 (1959).
2 53 N.H. at 402, 16 Am. Rep. at 344-45.
Mo., Commentary (1973). See also R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) §
14 (amended through July 1965) (U.S.S.R.), where "[e]xtreme necessity" is a defense
when, inter alia, "such danger cannot be eliminated by other means," but the threat must
be "real and immediate." Id. at 37.




may be defense evidence of a lack of alternatives, but the absence
of temporal "imminence" is not proof of the existence of alterna-
tives. A hypothetical self-defense case has been described as fol-
lows:
[A] cuckholded husband [who] imprisons and chains his wife's
latest lover in an abandoned cellar with the announced intention of
killing him after the passage of sufficient time for the stir over his
absence to quiet down, probably several months. Must the intended
victim wait until the final moment when the husband is about to
commit the fatal act, or may he kill the husband in self-defense at
any time during the period of imprisonment he can succeed in laying
hands upon him?"
Surely the answer to the question is clear. If the defendant has
no alternative, the threatened harm need not be imminent in the
lay and literal meaning of that term, that is, in time.
The second major failure of the case law development of
necessity, even when recognizing that the purpose of the immin-
ence requirement is, in part, to focus attention on the question
of whether there were alternative and less drastic courses of ac-
tion that would have averted the harm, has been the proclivity
of judges to find, after the fact, the existence of unrealistic or
unreasonable alternatives. In the famous case of Regina v. Dudley
& Stephens,'" the jury made a special finding of fact that at the
time defendants killed, they had no reasonable prospect of res-
cue.' In discussing this case, Justice Cardozo said: "who shall
know when masts and sails of rescue may emerge out of the
fog?"3 Under such a view, is death by starvation ever imminent?
Jerome Hall has pointed out that:
It is therefore clear that neither the English court nor Cardozo
considered the ethics of the doctrine of necessity. They rejected the
It is sometimes said that the defense of necessity does not apply except in
an emergency-when the threatened harm is immediate, the threatened
disaster imminent. Perhaps this is but a way of saying that, until the time
comes when the threatened harm is immediate, there are generally options
open to the defendant, to avoid the harm, other than the option of disobeying
the literal terms of the law-the rescue ship may appear, the storm may
pass; and so the defendant must wait until that hope of survival disappears.
Id. at 388.
S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 497 (1969), evidently
based on Edgar Alan Poe's "The Cask of Amontillado."
14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
31 Id.
32 B. CARDOZO, Li\AW AND LITERATURE 113 (1930).
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doctrine because, in effect, they denied that a state of necessity
could ever exist. Such repudiation of the doctrine of necessity
amounts not to the invalidation of the principle to conserve the
maximum value possible but to such a challenge of it on empirical
grounds as to guarantee that it could never be applied."
The persistence of these problems is clearly illustrated by a
consideration of the prison escape cases when necessity is raised
as a defense. One of the worst examples of this is found in State
v. Green.3 The 19-year-old defendant had been repeatedly at-
tacked and homosexually raped by a number of inmates. After
several unsuccessful requests for protection from prison officials,
he was allegedly told to defend himself, submit, or "go over the
fence." On the day of his escape, the defendant was confronted
by five inmates who threatened him with death or serious bodily
injury if he did not agree to submit to homosexual acts during the
remainder of his term at the training center. They were going to
return that night. That evening, before the inmates returned, the
defendant escaped. The Missouri Supreme Court held the necess-
J. HALL, supra note 3, at 434.
To say that a threat of future harm is not sufficient is to ignore the fact that
the nature of a threat is to hold out a future harm. All danger to the "du-
ressed" is in the future, for if it were in the present it would no longer be a
danger or a threat but would be an accomplished harm. Wherever danger is
the spring for human action, as when one seeks to avoid it, such avoidance
implies a temporality not coterminous with the harm threatened. It is
equally true that all harms done have been past threats, since these threats
occur before the "duressed" acts. Thus, where the courts have required pres-
ent danger to life rather than past or future fear of danger to life, such
distinctions are meaningless. To be present, the threat or harm threatened
would have to occur contemporaneously with the act done ....
A better approach would be to ... state that the threat ... must occur
within a "reasonable" time before ... the harm ....
Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 313, 328-
29 (1957).
1 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972); Note, Necessity As
a Defense, 37 Mo. L. REV. 550 (1972). Even the most gruesome and intolerable living
conditions historically have afforded no justification. Aderhold v. Soileau, 67 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1933); People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); State v. Palmer, 45
Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (1950); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 194 N.W. 191 (1923); State v.
Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am. Rep. 563 (1880). However, an inmate may leave a burning
prison to save his life. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921). The distortion of the
necessity defense in prison escape cases-cases to which it clearly applies-undoubtedly
results from the courts' own "necessity" predicament. Those courts which reject the
defense in that context are simply making the value judgment that recognition of the




ity defense unavailable, since defendant had not adequately pur-
sued alternative courses of action. They not only stressed alterna-
tives that may have resulted in Green's death, but also held that
the threatened danger which occasioned his escape was too re-
mote in time from the commission of the offense. 5 The one dis-
senting justice pointed out the illusory nature of any alternative
remedies, due to the reality of prison life and the defendant's
previous experience. 6 The requirement of temporal immimence
does not serve its normal purpose in this situation; the mere
passage of time does not make reasonable alternatives available.
The recognition in the Commentary to the Missouri Proposed
Code that "imminence" is not exclusively a temporal concept
may help overturn the majority opinion in Green.
A Michigan court of appeals, in a similar situation in People
v. Noble,3" had earlier refused to allow the defense. However, a
different Michigan court of appeals, in People v. Harmon,3 disa-
greed with the decision in Noble stating that "[t]he facts in
[such a case] were more than sufficient to require the submission
of the defense . . . to the jury" and that "whether the alleged
danger was immediate or imminent is, in all but the clearest
cases, to be decided by the trier of fact taking into consideration
all the surrounding circumstances, including the defendant's
opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm. '31
The court in Noble recognized that conditions in Michigan
penal institutions were in need of reform, but maintained that
such a reform was properly left to the legislature. However, while
agreeing with the statement that "penal reform by the Legisla-
ture is the best solution to this difficult problem," the Harmon
court did not "because of that fact, preclude a defendant from
presenting available defenses.""0 Five years after the decision in
Noble, and in the same year as Harmon, the division of the court
" 470 S.W.2d at 568. It should be noted that in Missouri, a person may use such force
as is reasonably necessary to prevent a forcible attack of sodomy, even if such force results
in the death of the attacker. State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1959); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 559.040 (Vernon's 1953).
470 S.W.2d at 568-71.
'7 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
3 People v. Harmon, 58 Mich. App. 482, 484, 220 N.W.2d 212, 214 (1974).
Id. at 485, 220 N.W.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
0 Id.
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of appeals that had decided Noble held in People v. Luther' that
it was error to instruct a jury that necessity was not a defense to
a charge of escape. Noble was not even cited. This year the Su-
preme Court of Michigan affirmed both Luther"
2 and Harmon4 3
and took the position that Noble did not really address the issue
at hand. In Harmon, the Michigan Supreme Court pointed out
that the defendant did not leave the prison until 24 hours after
the homosexual threat, and nevertheless affirmed the opinion of
the court of appeals, presumably indicating approval of the lan-
guage quoted above from that decision." Unfortunately, the court
refers to the defense as "duress" thereby further confusing the
distinction between duress and necessity.
In 1929 a California appeals court also rejected the defense
of necessity in a prison escape case, People v. Whipple.45 The
court stated that "if no statutory excuse or justification apply as
to the commission of the particular offense, neither the common
law nor the so-called 'unwritten law' may legally supply it." Since
the existing California Penal Code did not recognize a justifica-
tion of necessity, neither did the court, despite the claim of "bru-
tal treatment of extreme atrocity" by prison authorities. 8 People
v. Richards47 later upheld Whipple by rejecting a nonstatutory
justification of necessity. There the defendant's escape was not
found to be justified by duress, 48 since the threats were intended
to force the defendant to commit homosexual acts, and were not
intended to force him to escape. 4 However, a different California
appellate court, in People v. Lovercamp,5 ° held the necessity de-
fense to an escape charge a "viable defense," but placed "rigid
limitations" on that "viability" by making it available only under
" 53 Mich. App. 648, 219 N.W.2d 812 (1974).
42 232 N.W.2d 184 (Mich. 1975).
43 232 N.W.2d 187 (Mich. 1975).
" Id. at 188.
100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); a similar result was reached in State v.
Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964).
," 100 Cal. App. 261, 267, 279 P. 1008, 1009-10 (1929). See also Note, Duress and the
Prison Escape: A New Use for an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1062 (1972); Comment,
Escape: The Defenses of Duress and Necessity, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 430 (1972).
,1 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969), citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West
1969).
1 Id. at 773-74, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
49 Id.
43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
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certain conditions.5 ' Thus, the appellate courts of California are
now divided on whether the necessity defense is available in
prison escape cases. The Supreme Court of California has yet to
address the question.
The Arizona Supreme Court 5 has followed the Whipple-
Richards line of cases. Lack of imminence was also stressed by
the Kansas Supreme Court in what was technically a duress
situation,53 when a deputy warden, according to defendant's offer
of proof, threatened to kill him if he did not escape:
Two other cases may provide some inferential support for the
Harmon-Lovercamp approach allowing the defense. In Matthews
v. State,5" the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in rejecting the de-
fense argument that it was error to refuse to let the defendants
present their evidence to the jury, stressed the fact that:
[T]he failure of a prisoner to immediately return to lawful custody
after the impending danger has been avoided, is within itself an
escape and prevents a defense of escape because of necessity ....
In the instant case the prisoners not only made their immediate
escape from the alleged impending danger, but they continued to
flee farther away from the place of their lawful confinement."
The court also appears to have been influenced by the fact that
the defendants had used a gun to effectuate their escape, a fact
also present in the Arizona case."
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case is less clear. In People
Id. at 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack
or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time
for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints
which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is no time
or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There is no evidence of force or
violence used towards prison personnel or other "innocent" persons in the
escape; and (5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities
when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
Id. at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (footnote omitted). Although an inmate may be
justified in escape from a penal institution, to thereafter remain at large on his own
volition constitutes the crime of escape. United States v. Chapman, 455 F.2d 746, 749-50
(5th Cir. 1972).
"2 State v. Alberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973).
13 State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 581, 516 P.2d 984 (1973), decided under KAN. STAT. ANN.
21-3209(1) (Supp. 1972) (a compulsion statute).
288 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1974).
Id. at 714.
State v. Alberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973).
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v. Barker,57 the defendant was threatened by other prisoners. De-
fendant contended the trial court had committed error by refus-
ing his motion for a directed verdict. The court said:
Whether or not defendant's theory of the case constituted a
viable defense to the crime of escape is beyond the pale of our imme-
diate concern; nonetheless, this theory of duress [sic] as an excuse
was fully presented to the jury by the trial court in its instructions.
The jury, by its verdict, found the facts othewise than as contended
by the defendant and his witnesses."
Whether any weight was given on appeal to the fact that
Barker did not turn himself in is unclear. The state's brief quoted
from that part of the Matthews opinion quoted above, and
pointed out that Barker was arrested in California almost a year
after the escape. 9 While the court did advert to the fact that the
defendant was arrested in California, if the jury was properly
instructed on the necessity defense and found the escape unjusti-
fied, there was no reason for the court to go into the matter.
The courts are divided on the escape cases. Some stress the
limitation on the defense of necessity that the harm threatened
must be "imminent," and then find that it was not. They also
stress unreasonable alternatives. Other courts require the defen-
dant to terminate the continuing nature of the harm done (es-
cape) by turning himself in when he has reached safety, and there
is slight authority in these cases that the harm of escape must not
be enhanced by use of a deadly weapon. It should be noted that
none of these cases was decided under a modern necessity statute.
The already all too common judicial practice in prison escape
cases of stressing unrealistic alternatives and the judicial habit
of assuming that "imminence" is to be "measured by the clock"
even in the prison context have both been given recent impetus
by the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Robertson,6' an
opinion that not only perpetuates these approaches, but signifi-
cantly expands them.
First, the defendant was not convicted of escape but of pos-
session of a weapon in prison.' The defendant testified that he
7 538 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1975).
" Id. at 109-10. While the court used the term "duress," presumably the reference
should have been to necessity.
1, Answer Brief for Appellee at 4, People v. Barker, 538 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1975).
0 No. 75-088 (Colo. Ct. App., Sept. 3, 1975), 4 CoLO. LAWYER 2130 (Nov. 1975).
11 CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-203(I)(b) (1973).
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left his cell in the morning of the day of the offense and locked
it. When he returned later in the day it was open and his mattress
had been moved. He looked under it and found a knife. He
testified that he did not want to turn the knife in to the authori-
ties for fear other inmates would learn of his cooperation. He said
he was caught with the knife on his way to try to dispose of it
himself. An official evidently partly corroborated his testimony
regarding his fear of assault if he became known as one who
cooperated with prison authorities. Thus, Robertson is the first
necessity case to arise in the prison context that does not involve
outright escape.
Secondly, Robertson is the first prison case to be decided
under a modern necessity statute. The Colorado statute provides
in part:
[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifia-
ble and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure
to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to
occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no
conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, accord-
ing to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirabil-
ity and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirabil-
ity of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute
defining the offense in issue .
2
Thirdly, the appeal was taken because the trial court took
the necessity defense from the jury and decided on its own that
the defense was not made out by the testimony offered at trial.
A trial court has statutory authority to do this under the Colorado
provision that
[w]henever evidence relating to the defense of justification is of-
fered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the consideration
of the jury, the court shall first rule as a matter of law whether the
claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a
justification."
This language originated in the New York statute and was copied
in the Michigan proposal which served as the model for Colorado.
The commentary to the Michigan code states:
To control possible misuse of the "choice of evils" concept, the trial
judge is to screen the evidence offered by the defense before the jury
62 Id. § 18-1-702(1).
- Id. § 18-1-702(2).
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hears it; if the matter is mishandled it becomes a question on ap-
peal. 4
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that "an allegation by
a defendant of a generalized fear of retaliation will not support
the defense. Put simply, the threat to defendant's person must be
so definite, specific, and imminent as to rise beyond mere specu-
lation." 5 This application of the statutory "imminence" require-
ment was derived from People v. Lovercamp, the California
Court of Appeals decision discussed earlier.
There is an even more troublesome question about this case
quite apart from the overly stringent definition of imminence. If
one steps back a very short distance from this opinion, that ques-
tion becomes clear: Why is Robertson being punished for what he
did? He harmed no legally protected interest. He did not even
increase the risk of harm to anyone as escape cases may tend to
do. In fact, his conduct may have tended to decrease risk-he was
trying to secretly dispose of a weapon.
The heart of the necessity defense involves a balancing of
harms-the harm threatened against the harm done. How can the
balance be tipped against a defendant who did no harm solely
because the harm threatened might be thought by some to be too
remote to satisfy a strict interpretation of the term "imminent"?
No matter how improbable or temporally remote the threatened
harm, should not the scales be tipped in favor of a defendant who
sought to avoid that threatened harm by an act that posed no
threat to anyone? The answer, we believe, lies not in the holding
that the defendant's testimony did not satisfy the Colorado statu-
tory definition of the necessity defense; the point rather seems to
be that no one believed Robertson. Thus, despite the necessity
defense being raised under a modern statute-indeed, largely
because of it-defendant was allowed to be convicted of a harm-
less act (if the defendant's version is to be believed) in a prison
setting without even being allowed to take his defense to the jury.
We have serious questions regarding the consistency of this prac-
tice with the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial."
MICH. at 61.
" 4 CoLO. LAWYER at 2131.
See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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In addition to the imminence requirement, some jurisdic-
tions further require the action of the defendant to be an "emer-
gency measure." New York finds this necessary so as to closely
"limit its application and to preclude extension beyond the nar-
row scope intended. '"6 Maryland has also added this phrase, find-
ing that it "is probably sound caution; true necessity situations
involve emergencies. '70 The commentary to the Massachusetts
proposal refers to an "emergency situation," although the statute
itself is silent on the point.71 The Colorado Court of Appeals could
as well have relied on this limitation to affirm Robertson's convic-
tion.
Apart from the imminence limitation and the relational re-
quirement that the harm threatened be greater than the harm
done, most proposed codes and existing statutes do not limit the
threats of harm which justify a person in committing what would
otherwise be a crime. While most jurisdictions merely require
that a "harm" or a "harm or evil" be avoided or sought to be
avoided, 72 Illinois, New York, and some others require a "public
or private injury, ' 7 even though there appears to be no signifi-
cance intended in the distinction. Wisconsin, however, requires
a threat of public disaster, death, or great bodily harm. 7 Califor-
nia added "serious damage to property" to the Wisconsin formu-
lation.
7 5
Most new codes require that the actor entertain a "reason-
able belief in the necessity of his conduct. 76 However, the New
York statute and the states following it insist the actor be
right-not just reasonable. The defense is available only when
"such conduct is necessary" to avoid the injury.77 None of the
commentaries to statutes taking the New York approach explain
" See, e.g., ARK.; CoLO.; DEL.; MD.; MiCH.; Mo.; N.Y.; OREs.
0 N.Y., Comment. See also People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
" MD., Comment.
7 See, e.g., MAss.
'2 See, e.g., PA.
73 ILL.; N.Y.
74 Wis.
CAL. Maine restricts it to "physical harm to himself or another." ME. The limita-
tion found in Wisconsin and California is comparable to the limitations on the duress
defense at common law. LAFAvE & ScoTr at 374.
7 See note 125 infra.
' See note 114 infra.
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why criminal liability should depend on the actor being right,
rather than reasonable. And since necessity is composed of three
elements-perception of a threat of harm, absence of less drastic
alternatives, and a value choice-under the New York formula-
tion, the actor is required, presumably, to be right about all three
of these components. Most jurisdictions require only that the
actor be right in his value choice, not in his assessment of the
necessity for such a choice. Other defenses, including the use of
deadly force, are less restrictive.
What constitutes an acceptable source of the threatened in-
jury has been categorically limited by some authorities to a force
majeur or the "physical forces of nature.""8 This limitation re-
quires the defendant to argue the duress justification rather than
necessity when "natural" forces are not involved. The duress de-
fense is usually (and inexplicably) more limited than is the ne-
cessity defense. Among other differences, it is required that some
person intended by his conduct to coerce the defendant to commit
a crime. Hence, duress is not available when defendant escapes
prison to avoid harm to himself from authorities or other prison-
ers, since they did not intend defendant to escape.79 To impro-
perly classify defendant's necessity defense as a duress defense
will, therefore, cause him to lose. To insist upon a duress-or-
nothing approach, merely because human agency was culpably
involved in bringing about the choice of evils situation, is clearly
wrong. Indeed, it is often possible to find culpable human activity
7 LAFAVE & Scorr at 381. However, a contrary view has been expressed.
[Tihere would be grave difficulties if a person's right to protect himself or
another against, for instance, a danger created by fire, or an animal, turned
on whether some person had caused the fire or had failed in his responsibility
to control the animal. There is nothing to suggest that English law makes
any such distinctions.
Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMB. L.J. 87, 89 (1972)
(footnote omitted). See also U.S.S.R. at 36:
A danger that is alleviated in the state of extreme necessity can originate
from different sources: from the action of natural forces (floods, fires started
from lightening, etc.), or any mechanism (for instance a car without brakes),
or from the attack of an animal. Danger can be provoked also by a man who
is harming or threatening harm to any legally protected interests.
(Footnotes omitted.)
7' Duress was properly relied upon in State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 581, 516 P.2d 984
(1973), because defendant was told by a deputy warden that he would kill him if he did




behind the problematic situation even when it is conceded that
the case is properly one of necessity. For example, if one leaves
the scene of a car crash to rush an injured person to a hospital,
human agency brought about the choice of evils situation, but no
one would suggest that the driver's defense is duress-or-nothing.
This is recognized by the codes in their virtually universal rejec-
tion of any limitation on the defense because of the source of the
threatened harm. The lone exception is Wisconsin, which re-
quires the "pressure of natural physical forces." ' 0 Classification
problems will continue to exist even though, except in Wisconsin,
choice of evils is not restricted to force majeur situations. The
reason is that, given an adequately drafted necessity statute,
there is no need for the more limited justification provided by the
duress or coercion statutes.
A further question arises concerning the nature of the harm
sought to be avoided-must the event threatened actually involve
a harm or will it suffice if it is a crime? For instance, may the
actor steal and destroy another's cache of marijuana, in order to
prevent the other person from using or selling it? It is perhaps for
cases such as this that the Model Penal Code uses the phrase "to
avoid a harm or evil."'8 If the actor is limited to preventing "in-
jury," as in New York, his case appears more difficult than if he
is permitted to avoid "evils" as well.
At one time, the question whether a person who stole food as
the only means of preventing his imminent death by starvation
could be justified by necessity gave rise to considerable discussion
U Wis.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
MR. SMITHERS: I have perhaps a picayune one. Is the word "evil"
defined anywhere in this Code?
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: No, it is not. It was used deliberately
rather than "harm" which is in some ways more conventional, because we
thought it a word of broader meaning. If you are thinking only of personal
crimes, crimes of personal violence, "harm" would be a better word; but we
must have in mind even regulatory offenses, for example, given in the com-
ments. There is the illustration of a physician who dispenses a limited drug
in what he considers to be an emergency without prescription.
There I think that all the evils that the Harrison Act is directed at would
have to be taken into account in determining whether the emergency justi-
fied the violation.
It is, incidentally, the word that Holmes used in The Common Law in
his essay on the criminal law.
ALI PROCEEDINGS 229 (1958).
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among legal scholars.82 Although legal scholars remained rather
evenly divided on the subject, moral philosophers generally
agreed that such an act was not ethically culpable.13 There is no
American case which directly addresses the question. In State v.
Moe"4 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion of the defendants for grand larceny and riot when, during a
demonstration in support of a demand for a greater allowance of
flour from the Red Cross relief committee, the crowd entered a
nearby store and "helped themselves to groceries." The court
stated that "economic necessity has never been accepted as a
defense to a criminal charge. '8 5 The precise issue in the case arose
because the trial court excluded general "evidence of economic
conditions at and before the time the offenses charged occurred
.... "8 The comment to the proposed Washington State necess-
ity statute, a statute which was not adopted, concluded that "this
section is not inconsistent with Moe, if for no other reason than
the implicit holding in the case that that particular conduct pro-
duced greater harm or evil than the harm or evil it was designed
to avoid." ' The court in Moe was correct in denying the defense
because an imminent threat was not alleged nor was it alleged
that he lacked reasonable alternatives.8 The difficulty with the
opinion is that that court classed the defendant's defense as "eco-
nomic necessity" and then held that "economic necessity" is
never a defense. This is too broad and subject to misunderstan-
ding. If all the other elements of the necessity defense are satis-
fied, it is of no significance that the cause of the immediate harm
See generally G. WILuAmS, CRIMiNAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 236 (2d ed. 1961).
See, e.g., T. AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE H-11, q. 66, a. 6; and V. BOURKE, ETHICS
389 (2d ed. 1966). Blackstone took the position that the defense in these circumstances
was "an unwarranted doctrine" and "antiquated, the law of England admitting no such
excuse." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 31.
8 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1929). See also United States v. Palmer, 458 F.2d 663,
665 (9th Cir. 1972); Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
" 174 Wash. 303, 307, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (1929).
u Id. at 306, 24 P.2d at 638.
"7 WASH., Comment.
0 Although defendants had demanded more flour from the Red Cross, it was never
alleged that defendants or others were suffering from starvation or malnutrition or were
threatened with any type of bodily injury due to a shortage of food. The fact that they
did not possess as much flour as they may have liked, does not constitute the "harm or
evil" required now by statute nor then by common law. Nor was it alleged that defendants
were without reasonable alternatives for procuring food.
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may be "economic." None of the new statutes place an "economic
necessity" limitation on the defense.
Whether the defendant was successful in averting the threat-
ened harm appears to be irrelevant. This is most clear under
statutes which refer only to the harm "sought to be avoided" 9 or
"the harm which the actor seeks to prevent.""0 Less clear are
statutes, such as New York's, which refer to defendant's conduct
which "is necessary . . . to avoid . . . injury."'" To require the
defendant to in fact avert the threatened harm would, of course,
predicate the existence of the defense in many circumstances
upon purely fortuitous events entirely outside the defendant's
control.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE HARM DONE
Taking the life of an innocent person has been the subject of
much speculative commentary. An "innocent" person is evi-
dently one not committing a crime and the limitation, where
there is one, is confined to intentional killings. The only Ameri-
can authority on the question is a federal district court opinion,
United States v. Holmes.2 Following a ship wreck, crew members
lightened the load threatening their life boat at the expense of a
number of passengers. One of the crew members was indicted for
manslaughter and a jury convicted him of that offense. Defen-
dant received a 6-month jail sentence. The trial court seemed to
have been willing to hold that had due deference been paid to the
different status of passengers and crew members, and if lots had
been used to select from each group, the defense of necessity
might have been available. That dictum was rejected in an Eng-




,2 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383), 1 Wall Jr. 1 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
" 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). See also, Comment, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and
Procedural Aspects of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 34 U. CIHI. L. REv. 387 (1967), where
the author observes that "Victorian juries customarily convicted in hardship cases, confi-
dent of royal reprieve. It is true that by the way [the trial judge] posed the choice between
conviction and special verdict, he effectively deprived the prisoners of a chance of acquit-
tal," id. at 396, and that "[bly removing the genuineness of threat to Dudley and Ste-
phens through the royal prerogative system, the judges left themselves freer than they
might otherwise have been to decide the case on abstract rather than human-or even
realistic-considerations." Id. at 405. See also Brody, Son of the Speluncean Explorer, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1233 (1970); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HAJv. L. REV.
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dants killed the weakest passenger of their open boat for food.
Perhaps the rejection of the Holmes dictum by the English court
was dictum there, as well, because the defendants did not use a
random method of selection which the Holmes court had sug-
gested was "the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to
God, for selection of the victim."9
The common law rejection of the defense when the inten-
tional killing of an innocent person was involved,9" appears now
to be almost universally rejected itself." The most common statu-
616 (1949); Hicks, Human Jettison, 1 LAW. Q. REv. 387 (1927); Stephen, Homicide by
Necessity, 1 LAW. Q. REV. 51 (1885).
" The trial court specifically rejected the Holmes dictum on the drawing of lots as
an appeal to providence as it "would seem almost to verge upon the blasphemous."
Comment, supra note 93, at 392.
" Justice Cardozo observed:
Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on
the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is
no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their
going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and
make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the darkness for
them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety.
If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others,
the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. Who shall
choose in such an hour between the victims and the saved?
B. CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE 113 (1930). In R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949), the court, in determining the application of
language in an insurance policy, stated in dictum that it "appears to be established .. .
that necessity will never excuse taking the life of an innocent person. ... Id. at 605.
Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935); Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So.
301 (1893).
a MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
It would be particularly unfortunate to exclude homicidal conduct from
the scope of the defense . . . .For recognizing that the sanctity of life has a
supreme place in the hierarchy of values, it is nonetheless true that conduct
which results in taking life may promote the very value sought to be pro-
tected by the law of homicide. Suppose, for example, that the actor has made
a breach in a dike, knowing that this will inundate a farm, but taking the
only course available to save a whole town. If he is charged with homicide of
the inhabitants of the farm house, he can rightly point out that the object
of the law of homicide is to save life, and that by his conduct he has effected
a net saving of innocent lives. The life of every individual must be assumed
in such a case to be of equal value and the numerical preponderance in the
lives saved compared to those sacrificed surely establishes an ethical and
legal justification for the act.
Id. See Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701
(1937).
So too a mountaineer, roped to a companion who has fallen over a precipice,
who holds on as long as possible but eventually cuts the rope, must certainly
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tory approach is to provide, merely, that if the other conditions
of the defense are all satisfied, the actor's "conduct" is justified.
The major exceptions are Wisconsin, where it is provided that "if
the prosecution is for murder, the degree of the crime is reduced
to manslaughter,"97 and Kentucky and Oklahoma, where it is
provided that "no justification can exist under this section for an
intentional homicide."' The Missouri proposal would limit this
defense to "conduct which would otherwise constitute any crime
other than a Class A Felony.""
Yet, as clear as the majority of state statutes and commen-
taries appear to be on the point, the Commentary to the Tenta-
tive Draft of the Model Penal Code, when directly confronting the
problem posed in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, says: "Such a
case must be decided if it arises but a legislator may consider that
the course of wisdom is to go no further than to state a valid
principle for its determination, without anticipating the decision
to be made."'0
Another situation involving the taking of the life of an inno-
cent is euthanasia. At one point in the American Law Institute
discussion about the Model Penal Code, it was stated: "I do not
think [the proposed statute on the necessity defense] could
be granted the defense that he accelerated one death slightly but avoided the
only alternative, the certain death of both.
Id. at 738-39.
The Norwegian Penal Code Commission accepts the same position. Professor Anden-
aes commenting on their decision labels it "rather hardboiled justice." J. ANDENAES, THE
GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF NORWAY § 16 (1965). There is no doubt that such
a result is of utilitarian value; however, the question remains whether it is in fact "jus-
tice." If as the Model Penal Code states, "the sanctity of life has a supreme place,"
Comment at 8, it is not sufficient that the problem be resolved on quantitative terms
alone. To allow the killing of an innocent person with intent to do so, even for the common
good, is manifest injustice to the person killed.
11 Wis. The draft of the Indiana Penal Code refers only to "conduct," yet on the
question of taking life, the Comments state that the actor "arguably" would be justified
in "killing some persons to save a greater number." IND., Comment at 41.
" Ky. § 410. See also OKLA. § 1-3-3A. K. BRICKEY, KENTucKY CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1974),
takes the view that "[t]he penal law has traditionally reflected the value judgement that
the intentional taking of innocent life is never privileged." (Footnote omitted.)
" Mo.
'® MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). It has been sug-
gested that where there is no social consensus on a major question such as whether the
intentional taking of the life of an innocent person is ever justified, "the jury, as a cross
section of the social unit, can through its finding of guilt or innocence apply the existing
moral standards of the community to the case." Brody, supra note 93, at 1246.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
apply in the case where there wasn't that numerical differential
as to the lives saved, nor do I think that it could apply very well
in cases of euthanasia, so-called, because while the doctor may
act to alleviate pain I don't think a court could hold that pain was
a greater evil than death, which is the evil sought to be averted
by the law defining homicide.' 101 But when pressed on the matter
later, ("The question I had is whether or not the advisers and the
reporter intentionally left this question open for possible adjudi-
cation, or whether it is your considered judgment that this section
could not apply to a case of euthanasia."),102 the reply was that
"if the euthanasia problem were to be put explicitly, I have no
warrant for saying what position the advisers would take or the
position of the Council, and maybe.it will have to be faced. But I
thought that if it were to be faced it should be faced under homi-
cide and not here." 103 In the Commentary to the proposed statute
on "Causing or Aiding Suicide"''0 it is noted that "Under the
draft, as under the present statutes dealing specially with aiding
or encouraging a suicide, [that] special provision applies only
when the actor goes no further than aid or solicitation; if he is
himself the agent of the death, the crime is murder notwithstand-
ing the consent or even the solicitation of the deceased.'"
0 5
A question which needs to be clarified is posed by LaFave
and Scott: "A, driving a car, suddenly finds himself in a predica-
ment where he must either run down B or hit C's house and he
reasonably chooses the latter, unfortunately killing two people in
the house who by bad luck happened to be just at that place
inside the house where A's car struck ... , "o It is urged that A
is not liable in this situation because "it is the harm-reasonably-
expected, rather than the harm-actually-caused, which gov-
erns." 07 This conclusion is based on the language of the Illinois
statute which provides that the defendant must avoid an injury
which would be "greater than the injury which might reasonably
result from his own conduct." 08 The difficulty is that only the
201 ALI PROCEEDINGS 228 (1958).
202 Id. at 235.
"° Id. at 236.
:o MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"' Id. at Comment 2.





Illinois statute and the California Proposed Code make this con-
clusion clear.
Of course, the defendant in this case is guilty of no crime to
begin with. Were defendant charged with manslaughter (reckless
homicide), the difficulty would be that recklessness means a con-
scious disregard of a risk that is "substantial and unjustifia-
ble."'' 9 The same is true of crimes defined in terms of negligence.
Defendant needs no general justification defense when charged
with a crime based on recklessness or negligence since it is im-
plicit in the charge itself that the defendant's conduct was not
justified; unjustifiability of conduct becomes an element of the
charge itself and must be proved by the state.
It has been maintained that the necessity defense does not
apply to strict liability crimes."' This is incorrect. What is meant
is that "one cannot act by accident from necessity.""' In other
words, defendant must act with the conscious object to avoid a
greater evil, and his discovery after the fact that he did avoid a
greater evil will not satisfy the requirements of the defense. Thus,
one who intentionally violates a traffic law because of necessitous
circumstances may avail himself of the necessity defense even
though the crime charged is a strict liability crime.
The Model Penal Code may have inadvertently included an
additional limitation on the harms that can be justified. In a
little-noticed provision near the end of the Article dealing with
justification, and following the detailed provisions on the use of
force, the Code provides as follows:
Section 3.10. Justification in Property Crimes.
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure, or destruction of,
damage to, intrusion on or interference with property is justifiable
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
W' here the statute prohibited possession, regardless of possessor's intent, necessity
was not recognized as a defense. People v. Norris, 40 Mich. App. 45, 198 N.W.2d 430
(1972); Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (1970); Commonwealth v. New
York C. & H.R.R., 202 Mass. 394, 88 N.E. 764 (1909).
.. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 8,1958). A child may be kept
from school for reasons of health without permission of school board as a statute required,
State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902); a motorist may leave the scene of an
accident in which he is involved because of fear of bodily harm if he remained at the scene,
Greer v. State, 108 Tex. App. 356, 300 S.W. 640 (1927); Isom v. State, 37 Ala. App. 416,
69 So. 2d 716 (1954); and a motorist may leave the scene of an accident in which he is
involved where his passenger is injured and in need of medical care and he leaves so that
she may receive treatment, Woods v. State, 135 Tex. App. 540, 121 S.W.2d 604 (1938).
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under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in
a civil action based thereon, unless:
(1) the Code or the law defining the offense deals with the
specific situation involved; or
(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed
otherwise plainly appears."'
It was said at the 1958 Proceedings that:
Section 3.10 is a self-contained provision-it does not depend on any
other provision-which says that if you are charging a crime against
property, if the defendant can show that the conduct would have
been privileged in tort, then it is privileged in crime unless the Code
is inconsistent with that privilege .... "
The problem arises when defendant is charged with a property
crime and cannot satisfy the defense provided for by section 3.10.
For example, suppose defendant acted out of private-not pub-
lic-necessity and caused a loss of property by his actions. In this
situation he would have only an incomplete privilege under tort
law and would be civilly liable for any damages he caused."'
Because section 3.10 does not distinguish between complete and
incomplete privileges, as does tort law, the statute is ambiguous.
Because the defense under section 3.10 may be unavailable, the
defendant would want to defend under the more general section
3.02, Choice of Harm or Evils."' But can he? Section 3.02 may
be limited by section 3.10, which deals with property crimes. Yet,
would it not be odd if a defendant who commits an act that would
amount to a property crime may be found guilty because his
justification defense is limited to section 3.10 and he cannot sat-
isfy the privilege requirement of that defense, while a defendant
who causes personal injury might have a defense under section
3.02 under otherwise similar circumstances?
The uncertainty in this situation is compounded by the fact
that two of the illustrations provided under section 3.02 involve
property offenses: "Property may be destroyed to prevent the
spread of fire;" and "A cargo may be jettisoned . . . to preserve
the vessel.""'
112 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"' A.L.I. PaOCEEINGS, 225-26 (1958) (remarks by Professor Wechsler).
"' W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 126 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
263, at 495 (1965); Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests
of Property and Personality, 39 HAIv. L. REV. 307 (1925-26).
", MODEL PENAL CODE.
,' Id., Comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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It is perhaps for these reasons that section 3.10 has been so
poorly received. This is speculation on our part, since not one of
the commentaries to the necessity provisions in the new codes or
proposals even advert to the existence of Model Penal Code sec-
tion 3.10. Thus far, section 3.10 has been enacted only in Pennsyl-
vania." 7 It is included in legislation pending in Alaska"' , and New
Jersey."' It was included in the Idaho code, which adopted the
Model Penal Code in toto, but that entire code has been re-
pealed.' 0 It was originally included in the Vermont proposal,'2 '
but has since been dropped from pending legislation.
12
V. THE FAULT LIMITATION
Much of the law of necessity is rather vague, but the require-
ment that defendant be without fault in occasioning or develop-
ing the situation is especially so. It appears that the common law
required the predicament to develop through "no fault" of the
actor, and this requirement is perpetuated under many codes. 3
It has been said, for example, that a person lost in the wilderness
may break into a cabin to seek food to prevent starvation, unless
he was to blame in bringing about the situation.'24 Such an exam-
ple provides little assistance in resolving the problem, since it
neglects to provide a formula to determine what degree or type
of fault would preclude the defense. It can hardly be supposed
that liability of one lost in the wilderness for burglary of a cabin
would be determined by reference to whether a reasonable person
would have taken better maps, or whether'the lost person reck-
lessly crashed his airplane into a mountainside, or whether he
took along the amount of food he should have taken.
If the level of culpability in occasioning or developing the
situation is understood to be the same as that which would suffice




2 IDAHO (repealed the same year).
121 VT.
122 Id.
i2 See, e.g., CAL.; DEL.; ILL. ("without blame"); IND.; MIcH.; Mo.; N.Y.; S.C. It
should be noted that the statutes of three states do not provide a "fault" limitation: ORE.;
TEx.; Wis.
"' MD. § 35.05, Comment, citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment at 9 (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1958).
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tion appears reasonable. For example, if because of reckless driv-
ing, the defendant is required to make a choice-of-evils decision
that results in death, there is little problem in holding the defen-
dant liable for manslaughter of the reckless homicide variety. It
is an entirely different matter, however, to conclude that negli-
gent backpacking should result in denying the defendant his de-
fense to a burglary that was necessary to save his or another's life.
Furthermore, the meaning of the term "without fault" is not
clear from the cases. In an English case,' 25 defendant, while
drunk, awoke to discover that the car he was occupying was mov-
ing. He controlled the car and was convicted of driving while
intoxicated. It is difficult to understand how the defendant was
at fault, unless intoxication itself is enough to establish fault.
In another case, a Texas court upheld the denial of the de-
fendant's tendered jury instruction on the necessity defense and
his conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated. The de-
fendant testified that he took the wheel of the automobile in
which he was a passenger only because the driver appeared more
intoxicated than himself, and solely for the purpose of stopping
the automobile. The court stated that "[ilf appellant here is
found in a predicament, it is of his own doing, and he may not
by such conduct claim the benefit of a defense to which he is not
entitled."'2 6 In an earlier Texas case the defendant testified that
he and a companion had been drinking during the night and when
he returned home at about 1:45 a.m., he received a blow to the
head and was rendered unconscious. When he awoke shortly
thereafter he was lying in a pool of blood, and, since he lived alone
and had no telephone in his apartment, he decided to drive him-
self to the hospital. 127 The defendant conceded that he was driving
while intoxicated, but maintained he did so out of necessity,
"only for the purpose of seeking medical treatment for a serious
head injury." The court upheld the conviction and stated "[w]e
are aware of no such defense and decline to hold that an intoxi-
cated driver of an automobile upon a public highway commits no
offense if it be shown that a necessity existed, or that it appeared
to him to be necessary that he make the journey."'28 Thus, it
' Regina v. Kiston, [1955] 39 Crim. App. 66.
2, Sansom v. State, 390 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
" Butterfield v. State, 317 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958).
"' Id. at 943.
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appears that in Texas the mere fact of defendant's intoxication,
no matter how unrelated to the necessity situation, is sufficient
to vitiate the defense, at least where intoxication is an element
of the crime. It may have been the existence of these cases that
led the drafters of the Texas statute to omit the fault limitation. ,29
The Colorado code stands alone on this issue. It provides that
the situation must be "occasioned or developed through no
conduct of the actor ... ."11o No mention is made of any kind
of fault in bringing about the situation.
Besides the defendant's fault in occasioning the situation, his
culpable behavior will limit the defense in other ways as well. The
Model Penal Code addresses these limitations simultaneously in
the following provision:
When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the
situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the
necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section
is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness
or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. 3,
Another provision makes it clear that the actor must make a
correct value choice, and if he does not, the other questions will
not arise.
When the actor has made a proper choice of values, his belief
in the necessity of his conduct to serve the higher value excul-
pates-unless the crime involved can be committed recklessly or
negligently. But when the latter is the case, recklessness or negli-
gence in bringing about the situation requiring the choice of evils or
in appraising the necessity for his conduct may be the basis of con-
viction. This treatment of the matter, which is followed elsewhere
in the Article [dealing with the use of force], precludes conviction
of a purposeful offense when the actor's culpability inheres in reck-
I" TEX.
'' COLO. (emphasis added).
,3, MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). The following states are
in accord: ALAS.; ARK.; HAWAII; IDAHO; Ky.; ME.; MD.; MASS.; NEB.; N.H.; OKLA.; PA.; VT.;
WASH. In the Oklahoma proposed legislation the words "wanton" and "reckless" are used
but are defined as recklessness and negligence. OKLA. §§ 1-107(3) & (4).
The need for a special defense of necessity arises only with intentional acts.
If the act charged is one of negligence, there is no need to introduce the
technical doctrine of necessity, for the same result is achieved by inquiring
whether the defendant has behaved like a reasonable man. The adjudication
of negligence requires the same kind of value judgment as is involved in the
doctrine of necessity.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 734.
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lessness or negligence, while sanctioning conviction for a crime for
which that kind of culpability is otherwise sufficient to convict."'2
In determining whether defendant made a proper value
choice, evidently the facts are taken as he perceived them.M
However, even given a proper choice as the defendant understood
the facts, he still may be liable if he was negligent or reckless in
appraising those facts that, in his mind, gave rise to the necessity
for committing a crime.134 In the case of the negligent or reckless
backpacker who commits burglary, the defendant would still
have a complete defense because burglary cannot be committed
negligently or recklessly and there probably is no lesser included
offense that could be charged (unless one can find a prohibition
of reckless trespass). But the reckless driver who chooses to kill
A to avoid killing B and C could still be guilty of manslaughter.
Presumably, also, the general effect of intoxication would remain
the same in this context. That is "[w]hen recklessness estab-
lishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been
aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.'
'M
The question of the reasonableness of the appraisal does not
arise under the approach taken in New York and other states,
where there is no necessity defense unless "such conduct is neces-
sary.' ' 3 On the other hand, other codes only require that the
defendant "reasonably believes such conduct was necessary,"131
,' MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
'3 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 745.
"I R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 956 (2d ed. 1969). The case law has developed a variety
of formulations in articulating the limitation: "well founded fear," R.I. Recreation Center,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949); "well-grounded apprehen-
sion," Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); "if they acted bona
fide upon reasonable grounds," United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (No. 14,470)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1834); "well-grounded apprehension," Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137,
141, 13 So. 2d 54, 56 (1943); "reasonable grounds to believe," Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644,
674, 187 So. 392, 409 (1939); "reasonably seemed to be necessary," Frasher v. State, 8 Md.
App. 439, 449, 260 A.2d 656, 662 (1970); "reason to believe," State v. Goff, 79 S.D. 138,
139, 109 N.W.2d 256, 257 (1961); "founded on some reasonable ground," Morgan v. State,
35 Tenn. (3 Sneed) 475, 480 (1856).
,3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
,3, See, e.g., ARK.; CAL.; COLO.; DEL.; MD.; MASS.; MICH.; Mo.; N.Y.; ORE.; S.C.
,57 See, e.g., ALAS.; ILL.; IND.; TENN.; WASH. Evidently the same approach is taken
under the Soviet Code. U.S.S.R. at 37 states that "[ilf a person on the basis of circum-
stances did not and could not understand that the danger in reality did not and could
not exist and if a person has done an act to alleviate this imagined danger . . . what was
done cannot be considered an offense."
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but since no other provision is made, a defendant who negligently
brings about the situation or who is negligent in appraising the
facts evidently loses the defense completely. Unlike New York,
however, a defendant is only required to be reasonable, not right.
Under the Model Penal Code it is only required that the defen-
dant believe his conduct to be necessary, and this requirement is
qualified by the language quoted above.'38 Some states which
follow this approach have, nevertheless, considered it necessary
to qualify this language by adding "reasonably believe."'' 9
VI. LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION
Most of the codes provide that '[t]he issue of competing
values must not have been foreclosed by a deliberate legislative
choice," and follow the language of the Model Penal Code re-
quirements that:
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides
exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved;
and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does
not otherwise plainly appear."'
For example, the specific defense of duress will govern those par-
ticular situations to which it applies, even though necessity may
be involved and even though the necessity defense is usually
broader than the duress defense. Duress defenses are often lim-
ited by what type of threats are required and by what harms can
"I See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); HAWAII; IDAHO; Ky.; ME.;
NEB.; N.H.; OKLA.; PA.; VT.
" The commentary to the Washington proposal said:
The word "reasonably" has been inserted to indicate that any defense of
justification must be based on something more than simply a "good faith"
belief in the necessity of the conduct.
WASH., Comment 1. But at the same time the statutory provision retains the qualifying
language that if defendant is negligent or reckless in "evaluating the necessity for defen-
sive conduct," he may be guilty of any offense for which such negligence or recklessness
suffices. Id. Suppose defendant is negligent in deciding he must intentionally kill A to save
B and C. The Washington proposal says that when the defense is not established because
of criminal negligence then, in effect, defendant would be guilty of criminally negligent
homicide. That is the same result that would be obtained under the Model Penal Code.
This modification of the Model Penal Code simply introduces a redundancy despite the
fact that the Washington commentary refers to it as "narrowing of the MPC provision."
Id. at Comment 1. The Washington proposal is also evidently the only one which confines
the fault limitation to the question of evaluation of the necessity to act; it does not apply
to bringing the situation about.
'" MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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be done, while the trend in necessity statutes is to avoid such
limitations.'
The major effect of this limitation involves the use of force.'
All modem codes contain exhaustively detailed provisions on the
use of force and deadly force by a variety of persons in many
circumstances. The general justification of choice of evils is
meant to deal only with those situations to which the legislature
has not specifically addressed itself.43 As one commentary to a
necessity statute points out, "homicide committed by a private
citizen to effect an arrest is not justified because [another stat-
ute] so provides.""'
It is repeatedly said that the legislature is free to make spe-
cific value choices and to have its decision prevail when it does.'4
One may suppose, however, that these statements are overdone.
In Cross v. State, 1 the Wyoming legislature had enacted a com-
prehensive game law for the protection of wild animals which
enumerated those circumstances in which animals could be killed
and which omitted the right to kill animals in the protection of
" See notes 72-75 supra.
"' The commentary to Washington's proposed code states that the section does not
apply to the use of force because other statutes deal with that subject. WASH. at 65. This
seems clearly wrong. The Washington statute is based essentially on the Model Penal
Code and its commentary is largely devoted to the problem of taking life and, indeed, the
hypothetical used in the Washington commentary deals with homicide.
"0 See particularly the Practice Commentary to Naw YORK PEmAL LAW § 35.10 (1967).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the most commonly cited example of a case in which the
legislature has already resolved the question of value choices was legislation regulating
abortion. See generally G. WuJuMzs, THE SAcrrry OF LiE (1958); THE Mos~ar OF
AaOEMON (J. Noonan ed. 1970); Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MOD. L.
REv. 126 (1938).
'"Tx., Comment at 83.
,' "The defense of necessity is available only in situations wherein the legislature has
not itself, in its criminal statute, made a determination of values. If it has done so, its
decision governs." LAFAvE & Scorr at 382. A Georgia court upheld the conviction of
defendant for taking alcoholic beverage to a church for the use of his sick wife stating "the
privilege given by law to the physician is by the same law withheld from the layman. The
statute itself fixes the exceptions to the operation of the law. To these we cannot make
any addition." Bice v. State, 109 Ga. 117, 118, 34 S.E. 202, 203 (1899). Where defendant
was convicted of operating a snowmobile upon the shoulder of a highway, the court
rejected defendant's necessity defense on several grounds, one of which was "that the
legislative intent was to prohibit, with but two exceptions, the operation of snowmobiles
upon the roadway" and that defendant's conduct was not within the stated exceptions.
State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 199, 183 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971).
-- 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962).
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one's property. The state argued that no further exceptions, spe-
cifically the necessity defense, could therefore be permitted. The
court, however, recognized the defense, holding that protection of
one's property is a constitutional right and that "[i]f it is true
that the legislature intended that constitutional rights of persons
could not be asserted in this connection, then it clearly exceeded
its authority."'' 7 Although the Wyoming constitution lacks a spe-
cific provision directly granting a right to property, the court
found it was an "inherent and inalienable" right of the people,
contained within the state constitutional provision that "no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law."" 8 And, of course, state legislatures had made their
value choices in abortion cases, but this view did not prevail. 49
Thus, it is clear that legislative value choices are as amenable to
constitutional review-both state and federal-in this context as
in any other.
VII. WHO DECIDES WHAT?
While it is clear that the defendant must make a "proper"
value choice in trying to avert the threatened harm, it is less clear
who is to determine the propriety of the defendant's choice.1N
There is universal agreement that a defendant raising the defense
must subjectively believe that he has correctly decided the issue,
but it is just as certain that satisfaction of this requirement is not
by itself sufficient. Someone must make an after-the-fact deter-
mination that the defendant did or did not make an accurate
value choice, depending upon the jurisdiction, either in fact or
"I Id. at 374. The court stated that its holding was supported by the following cases:
Cotton v. State, 31 Ala. App. 399, 17 So. 2d 590 (1944); State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 152
N.W. 501 (1915); Commonwealth v. Masden, 295 Ky. 861, 175 S.W.2d 1004 (1943); State
v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86 (1940); Commonwealth v. Riggles, 39 Pa. D. &
C. 188 (1940); Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937); State v. Burke, 114 Wash.
370, 195 P. 16 (1921). 370 P.2d at 375.
10 370 P.2d at 376-77. The court also rejected the state's contention that a less dras-
tic alternative was available to defendant since any property owner whose property is de-
stroyed by a wild animal may file a claim for damages sustained. The court held that this
was not "an adequate remedy" since, under the statute, defendant would logically be
forced to watch a wild animal invade and possibly destroy even his home and if such
invasions were of a continuous nature, would be forced to repeatedly file claims and
perhaps engage in protracted litigation. Id. at 378.
.. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to
Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. Cmni. L. & C. 289, 296-98 (1974).
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given the facts as he perceived them. Most statutes avoid the
question by following the Model Penal Code:
The draft does not attempt ... to resolve how far the issue raised
by the defense should be determined by the court as one of law or
submitted to the verdict of the jury. The Council thought this ques-
tion best remitted to the law that generally governs the respective
functions of the court and jury. 5'
When the issue has been addressed directly by legislation, the
New York statute is usually followed:
Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this
section is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter
of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if estab-
lished, constitute a justification.12
Presumably, the trier of fact must still make the underlying fac-
tual determinations, but the court's resolution appears conclusive
in either direction, subject only to defendant's right to appeal.
While some courts have reached the same result as New York
without a statute by treating the claim as an offer of proof and
deciding the question as a matter of law,'13 a statutory provision
such as New York's may be useful in avoiding procedures like
those used in United States v. Kroncke.'54 There the trial court
allowed extensive testimony by a number of witnesses on the
necessity defense, but ultimately took the question away from the
jury in its final instructions. This could have been accomplished
more efficiently with an offer of proof.
A different view is expressed in an optional provision of the
South Carolina draft code:
Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this
section is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule initially on
the matter out of the presence of the jury, according to the procedure
used in determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession."5
"' MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
2 N.Y. The relevant part of the Maryland statute follows the New York provision,
but adds that "the court shall rule as a matter of law on its admissibility, according to
whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense."
MD. This addition appears only to clarify rather than modify the New York language;
Maryland thought it necessary in order "to avoid any problem with the jury-as-judge-of-
the-law provision of the state constitution, by making it clear that the judge is ruling only
on a question of admissibility of evidence." MD., Comment.
53 See, e.g., State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073
(1972).
459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
"' But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975).
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The adoption of such a procedural formulation may, depending
upon the jurisdiction, result in disadvantage to the defendant. In
some jurisdictions the confession procedure rules make the
judges' determination final; in others the jury is instructed that
they may find the confession involuntary even though the judge
did not. The use of the word "initially" suggests that the court's
determination is not final. If so, it would require that even if the
judge finds the evidence sufficient to establish the defense, the
jury is to be instructed that they are free to disagree and to
convict. The redetermination by a jury of the voluntariness of a
confession is, in those jurisdictions, designed to give a defendant
two chances of winning on that issue. The South Carolina necess-
ity provision, however, appears designed to give the defendant
two chances of losing the defense.
Although the existence of the necessity defense is subject at
least in part to resolution as a matter of law, it is unclear precisely
to what extent this is so. Consider the Texas statute:
Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately nec-
essary to avoid imminent harm; and
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly out-
weigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm
sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the
conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.'"
The New York procedural approach, alluded to above,'57 clearly
makes the determination under sections (2) and (3) a matter for
the court. It is less clear, however, whether section (1) in all
circumstances is to be resolved as a matter of law. Suppose, for
example, a rush-to-the-hospital case in which the court concludes
there was indeed need for harm avoidance and defendant's high
speed driving was the lesser evil, but that defendant should have
known that there was another hospital much closer to him on a
safer route and that defendant was negligent in not knowing this
fact. Does the defense go to the jury or is the judge to resolve it
against the defendant? Ordinarily, of course, if defendant could
satisfy section (2) above he could also satisfy the reasonableness
'" TEX.
" We refer, of course, to section 3.02, not section 3.10. We also have reservations
about trying, in legislation, to resolve in advance the question of taking innocent life.
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requirement of section (1); but not so in a case such as this, where
the actor has made an improper assessment of his alternatives,
given an acceptable emergency situation.
CONCLUSION: CODIFICATION OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
The most important issues regarding the necessity defense
are whether it should be codified, and, if so, with what degree of
detail. It is our view that the Model Penal Code provision ought
to be adopted without modification.5 8 We have surveyed in some
detail the various attempts to improve upon that draft. Most of
those states which have not accepted that version have ended up
placing more restrictions on the availability of the defense and we
are not convinced that all those restrictions were intentionally
included. This is true, for example, of the common requirement
that defendant be correct in his assessment of the need for ac-
tion,'59 and Colorado's unique requirement that the situation not
be brought about by defendant's "conduct."'' 0 Those restrictions
are unreasonable and almost certainly would not be imposed by
most courts if left greater latitude to develop the scope of the
defense.
Apart from the highly restrictive proposals based on the New
York model, there are three major approaches to the legislative
problem: (1) the New Jersey approach; (2) non-codification; and
(3) the Model Penal Code.'6 ' New Jersey takes a singular ap-
proach to codification of the defense by declining to adopt any
particular statutory formulation, but incorporating the necessity
defense into the Code
to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the Code nor
other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or de-
fenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative
purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear."1
2
Although there were no prior New Jersey statutes or criminal
cases dealing with the issue, the Revision Commission main-
tained that it was
'5' See note 153 supra.
"' See note 64 supra.
l See note 118 supra.





more appropriate to leave the issue to the Judiciary [since] [tihe
rarity of the defense and the imponderables of the particulars of
specific cases convince us that the Courts can better define and
apply this defense than can be done through legislation.11
This position is consistent with New Jersey civil case law develop-
ment which recognizes the justification of necessity as "a natural
right, of which government cannot deprive the citizen," but
which is nevertheless
a right not susceptible of any very precise definition, for the mode
and manner and extent of its exercise must depend upon the nature
and degree of necessity that calls it into action, and this cannot be
determined until the necessity is made to appear."'
It is also interesting that the Commentary refers the courts to the
Model Penal Code and the New York statute for guidance-those
statutes are in conflict on most of the important questions that
will arise.
The English took a similar approach in the late nineteenth
century. Sir James Stephan's Criminal Code Bill of 1878 con-
tained a provision dealing with the necessity defense, but it was
deleted from the Draft Code of 1879, because of an inability to
articulate the situations in which the defense would be available.
Parliament resolved the problem by leaving the doctrine where
they found it-a common law defense." 5 Stephan himself stated:
[Ilt is just possible to imagine cases in which the expediency of
breaking the law is so overwhelmingly great that people may be
justified in breaking it, but these cases cannot be defined before-
hand .... I see no good in trying to make the law more definite
than this, and there would I think be danger in attempting to do
so.160
13 Id., Commentary.
" Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 729 (1848), afl'd sub. nom. American Print Works
v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590 (1851).
The common law doctrine of necessity is one that is now too firmly estab-
lished to be drawn in question, and yet, perhaps, necessarily from its very
character, it seems somewhat undefined as to its application and extent.
Id. at 604. See also Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation
Case, 3 Amuz. L. Rv. 264 (1961); Note, Necessity as a Defense, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 71
(1921). For the development of the doctrine in the law of torts, see generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 114, at § 24; Bohlen, supra note 114.
" G. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 724. See also Glazebrook, supra note 78.
"' 2 J. STEPHAN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 109-10 (1883).
[Tihe law of cases of necessity is not likely to be well furnished with precise
rules; necessity creates the law, it supersedes rules; and whatever is
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Glanville Williams also takes the position that "[t]he peculiar-
ity of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibil-
ity of formulating it with any approach to precision."'' 7
Other American authorities have enumerated the difficulties
in codification of the defense.18 The Study Draft of a New Federal
Criminal Code by the United States Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws (the Brown Commission) contained the
following codification of the necessity defense:
Conduct which Avoids Greater Harm. Conduct is justified if it is
necessary and appropriate to avoid harm clearly greater than the
harm which might result from such conduct and the situation devel-
oped through no fault of the actor. The necessity and justifiability
of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to
the morality and advisability of the penal statute defining the of-
fense, either in its general application or with respect to its applica-
tion to a particular class of cases arising thereunder.'
This section of the Code, however, was deleted from the Final
Report of the Commission. The Comment to section 601, dealing
with justification in general, includes this explanation:
Congress has never enacted the rules which justify or excuse the
use of force against another or which generally provide a justification
or an excuse for the commission of otherwise unlawful conduct.
Chapter 6 sets them forth: to change some undesirable judicial deci-
sions, to clarify areas which are not clear under existing law and to
codify aspects of the federal law on the subject. This partial codifica-
tion is not an attempt to freeze the rules as they now exist. It may
therefore be desirable to be explicit that the statutory definition of
these rules is not intended to preclude the judicial development of
other justifications. For example, the so-called "choice of evils" rule,
i.e., that emergency measures to avoid greater injury may be justi-
fied, has not been included in this Chapter on the view that, while
its intended application would be extremely rare in cases actually
prosecuted, even the best of statutory formulations (see N.Y. Pen.L.
§ 35.10) is a potential source of unwarranted difficulty in ordinary
cases, particularly in the context of the adoption of the broad mis-
take of fact and law provisions found in the Code. Codification, as
reasonable and just in such cases, is likewise legal; it is not to be considered
as matter of surprise, therefore, if much instituted rule is not to be found on
such subjects.
The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 266, 165 Eng. Rep. 450, 459 (In. 1801) (Sir W. Scott).
, G. WILIAMS, supra note 82, at 728.
"' MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
New York City Bar Association, The New Criminal Code Proposed by the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 15 (1972).
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opposed to case-by-case prosecutive discretion, is regarded as pre-
mature. On the other hand, some Commissioners believe that a
penal code is seriously deficient if it does not explicitly recognize
that avoidance of greater harm is, if not a duty, at least a privilege
of the citizen. 70
It seems to us that there ought to be some legislative recogni-
tion of the defense-even as limited as the New Jersey ap-
proach-for two overlapping reasons. First, there are some states
where the courts have flatly refused to recognize the defense in
the absence of a statute.' Secondly, whether or not a court pre-
viously recognized it, the new codes are so comprehensive in their
treatment of defenses in general that failure to include a necessity
statute might well be taken as a legislative rejection of it, unless
the code clearly indicates that it is not exclusive as to defenses,
as few have. We have found only two states that make it clear by
statute that while the codes are exclusive as to definitions of
crimes,' 2 they are not intended to be exclusive as to the existence
or scope of defenses. 7 3 The matter is presently ambiguous in
states with no significant legislative history available to indicate
whether non-inclusion means non-recognition.
Indeed, the question might be raised whether a legislature in
fact has the power to abolish the necessity defense or even se-
verely restrict it as Wisconsin, New York, and some other states
have done. Does there reside in the courts an inherent
power-protected from infringement by the legislative branch by
the separation of powers doctrine-to recognize necessity as a
defense? The same question might be raised under the federal
constitution with respect to those state courts which have flatly
denied the existence of such a defense-does not due process
1 Hearings on Reform of the Fed. Crim. Laws and Procedures Before the Subcomm.
on Crim. Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., 43 (1971).
' See, e.g., State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1929).
'7 Washington has retained a curious provision:
Sec. 9A.04.060. COMMON LAW TO SUPPLEMENT STATUTE. The pro-
visions of the common law relating to the commission of crime and the
punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent with the constitution and
statutes of this state, shall supplement all penal statutes of this state and
all persons offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of this state
having jurisdiction of the offense.
Laws of 1975, ch. 260, 44th Legis., 1st Sess. (effective July 1, 1976).
"I These two states are California and Vermont. A similar provision is also found in
S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
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require recognition that a person may not be convicted of drunk
driving when he took the controls of a vehicle solely to save him-
self from serious bodily injury or death? Or when he escapes from
prison for the same reason? Surely in those cases the defense must
be recognized. Yet, no one has advocated restricting the defense
to what must constitutionally be recognized. The defense furthers
utilitarian objectives that go beyond the actor's own interests and
the defense ought to be recognized in that context as well.'
We agree that "it is better to be allowed a defense of uncer-
tain ambit than none at all." '75 But to conclude, as the New
Jersey Revision Commission has, that because all future situa-
tions cannot be anticipated none should be, goes too far in the
other direction from those who have over-legislated the matter.
The Model Penal Code: (1) distinguishes the defense from the
defenses of duress and involuntary act; (2) requires only that the
harm sought to be avoided be greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law violated; (3) eliminates limitations on the
harm threatened and the harm done; (4) omits reference to im-
minence; (5) includes a fault limiter but, unlike many of the
codes, it is defined and the consequences of the limitation are
made explicit; (6) recognizes legislative preemption; and (7)
leaves to local law the allocation of decision making at trial.
The Model Penal Code is broad, to be sure. But the only
danger in legislating broadly is that the statute might be thought
to protect persons beyond what the legislature intended because
of the impossibility of foreseeing all that might arise. But in the
end, a court and jury will have to determine whether the claimed
defense is reasonable.
Given the uncertain status of the defense under existing case
law, given the uncertain power of the legislature to restrict courts
in recognition of the defense, and given the unforeseeability of the
myriad cases which will arise, we think it unwise to attempt to
improve upon the Model Penal Code. The legislatures should
codify what it is useful to codify or what must be codified. But
legislative definition of the entire scope of the necessity defense
'7 H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 113-18 (1968).
'7 MODEL PENAL CODE at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1959).
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is probably not useful and certainly not required.7 6
' In Glazebrook, supra note 78, it is argued that if the draftsman is careful in
drafting the specific substantive statutes, there is no need for general recognition of the
necessity defense. He says:
A legal system in which a general defense of necessity was constantly invoked
over a wide range of offenses would have no special merit, for that would
simply reflect the draftsmen's failure to provide in advance for special cases.
Id. at 90. He later provides an example of the ad hoc approach to the necessity defense:
Section 24(3) of the Sexual Offenses Act 1956, for instance, provides that "A
woman shall not be liable to any legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal,
for taking away or being found in possession of any clothes she needed to
enable her to leave premises on which she was for the purpose of having
unlawful sexual intercourse or to leave a brothel."
Id. at 107. It is our contention that any criminal code that needs Section 24(3) is itself
deficient.

